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The article deals with the complexity of the International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO) Conventions and Recommendations and of the control procedures for 
their application as a factor that has a serious negative impact on their effective-
ness. An analysis of the Conventions and Recommendations and other measures 
taken by the ILO is offered with a view to optimizing this system. The prospects 
for codification of the ILO standards are considered. A conclusion is reached con-
cerning the possibility of gradual codification of the Conventions and Recommen-
dations according to broad thematic classifications with further prospects for the 
creation of a unified international labour code. Some possible directions for such 
thematic classifications are proposed.
A separate analysis is made of ILO control procedures, and a judgment is 
made that these procedures are lacking sufficient coordination and systematizati-
on. Proposals are made for simplifying the procedures, for the abrogation of rarely 
used and secondary procedures, and for a higher level of coherence of the existing 
procedures in order to make the application of the international labour standards 
more effective.
Some other proposals associated with reducing the complexity of the ILO stan-
dards and control procedures are made. 
Keywords: International labour standards, International Labour Organiza-
tion, international labour law, social rights, international instruments’ applica-
tion effectiveness 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is one of the oldest internati-
onal organizations, and it has a unique system of control over the application 
of the Conventions, Recommendations and Declarations adopted under its 
auspices. At the same time there are numerous statements1 at the academic 




the member states, prevents the ILO from making its system of international 
labour standards effective enough. This lack of power is rooted mainly in the 
consensual nature of international relations2 between sovereign states. The 
ILO is an international organization which is merely a forum for discussion 
of the issues of international labour law and not a supranational institution 
like	the	European	Union.	Therefore	this	system	of	“naming	and	shaming”	is	
necessarily the only means of control that the ILO possesses in its relations 
with member states.
Nevertheless, there are several contingent factors rooted in the ILO itself 
that impede the effective application of its international labour standards. The 
1 See: Arne D. A. Vandaele, International labour rights and the social clause: friends or foes 
(London: Cameron May, 2005), at 319-350; James Atleson, Lance Compa, Kerry 
Rittich et al., International labor law: cases and materials on workers’ rights in the global 
economy (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2008), at 88-104; Christian Barry, Sanjay G. 
Reddy, International Trade & Labor Standards: a Proposal for Linkage (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), at 43, 184; Kimberly Ann Elliot, Richard B. 
Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? (Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 2003), at 102-107; George Alexander 
Johnston, The International Labour Organization: Its Work for Social and Economic 
Progress (London: Europa Publications, 1970), at 279; Kaushik Basu, Henrik Horn, 
Lisa	Román,	Judith	Shapiro	(eds.),	International Labor Standards: History, Theory and 
Policy Options (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), at 271-302; George Tsogas, 
Labor Regulation in a Global Economy (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), at 52-54; 
Edward Weisband, Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame and Learning 
in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
44 (2000), at 643-666 et sqq.
2 See: Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law. 4th ed. (London and New York: 
Routledge,	 2010),	 at	 5;	 Rein	 Müllerson,	Ordering Anarchy: International Law in 
International Society (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), at 40-46, and 
many others.
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complexity of the ILO system of international labour standards and control 
procedures may be cited as one of the main contingent factors.3 This issue 
is dealt with in this article in two aspects: with respect to the system of ILO 
standards and of the monitoring system for their application. 
II. THE SYSTEM OF ILO STANDARDS
From the very foundation of the ILO, its Conventions and Recommenda-
tions were adopted not according to some systematic plan, but as a result of 
discussions of different issues at the International Labour Conferences4 (ILC), 
those being the main governing structure of the ILO. Over the course of time 
a large corpus of ILO Conventions and Recommendations was formed. Alt-
hough	they	were	sometimes	called	an	“international	labour	code”	in	the	early	
stages	of	the	ILO’s	existence5, in fact they were never codified. New Conven-
tions and Recommendations were adopted on issues that were the subject of 
previously adopted standards without any long-term strategic plan for filling 
in gaps in the international labour standards.
Since the 1960s proposals concerning some systematization and re-evalua-
3 Other obstacles to the effectiveness of the ILO international labour standards, in 
my	view,	include	excessive	flexibility	in	the	ILO’s	application	of	its	own	policies;	
the	 overload	 of	 the	 ILO’s	 supervisory	 bodies;	 insufficient	 political	 neutrality;	
the	 globalization	 process	 and	 “privatization”	 of	 international	 labour	 law	 (i.e.	
the rise of corporate codes of conduct, social labeling systems, international 
collective bargaining and other private initiatives that in certain ways compete 
with	 “traditional”	 international	 labour	 law	 institutions	 and	 standards).	 See	 the	
arguments for these positions in: Nikita L. Lyutov, Effektivnost’ norm mejdunarodnogo 
trudovogo prava. Monographia [Effectiveness of the international labour law: a monograph] 
(Moscow: Prospect, 2014), at 109-171.
4 International Labour Organisation (ILO), The Impact of International Labour 
Conventions and Recommendations (Geneva: ILO, 1976), at 13-14.
5 There were earlier publications of the ILO standards which were entitled 
“International	Labour	Code”	such	as	ILO,	International Labour Code, 1939 (Montreal: 
ILO, 1941); ILO, International Labour Code, 1951 (Geneva: ILO, 1954). However, 
none of these publications was a legal codification or consolidation but a mere 
presentation of the Conventions and Recommendations in a single publication. 
In 2005 a more comprehensive publication was issued that included not just the 
plain text of the instruments but also information about the ILO procedures and 
practices in applying the standards. See: Neville Rubin (ed.), Code of International 
Labour Law. Law, Practice and Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005).	The	term	“code”	is	used	again	in	later	publications	(see	below).
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tion of the previously adopted standards have been under discussion. The first 
ILO Director General who made such proposals was David Morse in 1963.6 
Serious discussion started in the 1970s, when the ILO Governing Body dele-
gate7 from Canada made a proposal8 to review all ILO standards in order to 
determine which of them were outdated, to understand what labour law issues 
were not well reflected in the existing norms, and to create ways of moderni-
zing the international labour code so that it would be updated regularly and 
systematically.
After discussing this issue in the ILO Governing Body, the International 
Labour Office started interviewing the member states on this issue in 1974. 
As a result, a special Working Party on International Labour Standards was 
established	in	1976	(the	“Ventejol	Group”	named	after	its	chairman,	an	em-
ployers’	delegate	from	France).9 The Ventejol Group worked on systematiza-
tion of the ILO Conventions and Recommendations from 1977 to 1979 and 
presented the results to the Governing Body at the 202nd Session in February 
and March of 1979.10 The Working Party had classified the Conventions and 
Recommendations into three groups: A) topical and high priority (7811 Con-
ventions and 76 Recommendations that should receive high priority support); 
B) standards that are in force but need revision (16 Conventions and 14 Re-
commendations); C) other existing Conventions and Recommendations that 
cannot be put into the first two groups (63 Conventions and 81 Recommen-
dation). A list of 43 topics for possible new international labour standards or 
6 ILO, International Labour Conference. Record of Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 1963), at 
440.
7 The ILO Governing body is composed of the delegates from the governments and 
most of the representative organizations of employers and employees from the ILO 
member states. See more about the ILO structure: Jean-Michel Servais, International 
Labour Law. 3d ed. (Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2011), at 21-45.
8 ILO, Governing Body, Minutes of the 184th Session, November, 1971 (Geneva: ILO, 
1971), at 87-95, 206-209.
9	 See:	Victor-Yves	Ghébali,	The International Labour Organisation: a Case Study of the 
Evolution of U.N. Specialised Agencies (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 
at 217.
10 ILO, Final Report of the Working Party on International Labour Standards. Official 
Bulletin (special edition). Vol. LXII series A (Geneva: ILO, 1979). 
11 Ibid.,	 paras.	 3-11.	 Some	 instruments	 from	 the	 “A”	 group	 are	mentioned	 in	 “B”,	
therefore the sum of the instruments in the three groups did not coincide with the 
overall number of Conventions and Recommendations (in 1979 these were 151 
and 159 respectively).
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matters for revision of the existing standards was also proposed. It was noted 
by the Working Party that this classification was not final or meant to be 
exhaustive or invariable.
After the approval by the ILO Governing Body of these results from the 
Working Party, there were a few years of debates within the ILO concerning 
the systematization of the norms and possible improvement of the controls 
over	their	application.	Employers’	delegates	insisted	that	the	process	of	setting	
norms should be slowed down or even stopped and that the ILO should con-
centrate on revision and consolidation of the existing standards.12
At the International Labour Conference of 1984 a decision was taken that 
Ventejol Group should renew its activity. The Group resumed its work in 
1985 and presented its results as a revised classification13 of the Conventions 
and Recommendations at the March Session of the Governing Body in 1987.14 
In addition to the revision of the earlier classifications, the Working Party 
examined the issues of abrogation of outdated standards, consolidation of the 
existing norms and adoption of new standards. The Minimum Age Conventi-
on, 1973 (No. 138)15, was taken as an example of such consolidation as it re-
placed ten earlier Conventions on minimum age for specific groups of workers. 
The Ventejol Group methodology of consolidation was relied upon later in the 
process of elaborating and adopting the next generation of ILO standards: the 
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC), the Promotional Framework for 
Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 (No. 187), and the Work 
in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188).
The	results	of	the	Ventejol	Group’s	work	were	examined	by	the	Governing	
Body over the next few years. In March 1995 the Governing Body decided16 to 
establish a new Working Party. The task of the new Working Party (called the 
“Cartier	Group”,	also	after	the	name	of	its	chairman)	was	to	determine	which	
12 ILO, International Labour Conference. Record of Proceedings, PR44. (Geneva: ILO, 
1984), at 10 et sqq. See also ILO Doc. No. GB.228/4/2.
13 ILO, Report of the Working Party on International Labour Standards, Official Bulletin, 
Special issue, Vol. LXX, 1987, Series A (Geneva: ILO, 1987), at para. 1.
14 Ibid., at 7.
15	 For	the	ILO	Conventions’	texts	see	the	ILO	Normlex	Database:	(http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12000:0::NO:::) [date of access to internet sources: 24th 
January 2014]. 
16 ILO, Governing Body Doc. No. GB.262/LILS/3. (Geneva: ILO, 1995). Quote by: 
Hugo Barretto Ghione, ILO recommendation 195: subjects, focuses and actors of vocational 
training (Montevideo: CINTERFOR/ILO, 2006), at 21.
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standards should be revised17 and what methods for revision could be appli-
ed to make the system of standards more coherent. It was also supposed to 
analyse the dynamics of the ratification of Conventions by the member states 
and to counter reluctance to ratify the revised newer Conventions as readily as 
the original Conventions on the same matters had been accepted. The Cartier 
Group worked from 1995 until March 2002.18 As the Cartier Group propo-
sed19, an instrument on amendment of the ILO Constitution was adopted so 
that the outdated Conventions might be abrogated.
The Cartier Group held 13 meetings and studied the status of 181 Conven-
tions and 191 Recommendations. As a result, a new and even more convoluted 
classification of the ILO standards was proposed to make their application 
more effective.20 This new classification divided these instruments into nine 
different groups each with a different status:
1. “Up-to-date instruments”, including eight fundamental Conventions21 on 
four core principles and rights at work22 and another four priority or governance 
17 Although earlier the Ventejol Group found that only a small number of instruments 
needs to be revised. See: ILO, Report of the Working Party on International Labour 
Standards, Official Bulletin, Special issue, Vol. LXX, 1987, Series A, Appendix I (Geneva: 
ILO, 1987).
18 See Governing Body Decisions on the Cartier Group proposals in the ILO Docs. 
Nos.: GB.264/9/2; GB.265/8/2; GB.267/9/2; GB.268/8/2; GB.270/9/2; GB.271/11/2; 
GB.273/8/2; GB.274/10/2; GB.276/10/2; GB.277/11/2; GB.279/11/2; GB.280/12/2; 
GB.282/8; GB.283/10/2 (Geneva: ILO, 1995-2002). 
19 ILO, Governing Body 267th Session Geneva, November 1996. Committee on Legal Issues 
and International Labour Standards. Possible amendments to the Constitution and 
Conference Standing Orders to enable the Conference to abrogate or otherwise terminate 
obsolete international labour Conventions. ILO Doc. No. GB.267/LILS/WP/PRS/1 
(Geneva: ILO, 1996). 
20 ILO, Governing Body. Working Party on Policy regarding the Revision of Standards. Follow-
up to the recommendations of the Working Party. ILO Document GB.283/LILS/WP/
PRS/1/2 (Geneva: ILO, 2002).
21 Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 on elimination of forced or compulsory labour, 
Conventions Nos. 138 and 182 on prohibition of child labour; Conventions Nos. 
100 and 111 on elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.
22 According to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
1998. See: Steve Charnovitz. The International Labour Organisation in its Second 
Century,	in	Jochen	A.	Frowein,	Rüdiger	Wolfrum	(eds.),	Max	Planck	Yearbook	of	
United Nations Law, Vol. 4 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), at 262-
278; Francis Maupain, L’OIT, justice sociale et la mondialisation (Leiden: Martinus 
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Conventions.23 Up-to-date status means that a specific Convention, Protocol 
to a Convention or Recommendation is treated by the ILO as in effect, and its 
application	is	monitored	to	the	full	extent,	including	the	member	states’	obli-
gations to report on Conventions and Protocols.24 Beside twelve governance 
and fundamental Conventions, there are 65 Conventions25, 5 Protocols26 and 
82 Recommendations27 that are considered up-to-date.
The monitoring of the governance and fundamental Conventions is perfor-
med by the ILO on a higher priority basis than that of the other up-to-date 
instruments.28 Since the 1990s the ILO has launched a campaign aimed at full 
ratification of all eight fundamental Conventions by all member states.29 The 
goal of this campaign was to secure full ratification by 2015 although there 
seems to be no real chance of this.30 The division of governance, fundamental 
and	“merely”	up-to-date	Conventions	is	not	very	clear	from	a	practical	point	
of view. As the Committee of Experts on Application of Conventions and Re-
commendations	(CEACR)	has	judged,	some	of	the	“merely	up-to-date”	Con-
ventions are hardly less important than the fundamental ones.31
Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), at 262-278 et al.
23 ILO Conventions Nos. 81, 122, 129 and 144 on labour inspection, employment 
policy and tripartite consultations.
24 As established by art. 22 of the ILO Constitution.
25 Conventions Nos. 14, 77, 78, 94, 95, 97, 102, 106, 110, 115, 118, 120, 121, 124, 
128, 130, 131, 135, 139, 140-143, 145-152, 154-157, 159-181, 182-185, MLC, 
187-189.
26 Protocols to the Conventions Nos. 81, 89, 110, 147 and 155.
27 Recommendations Nos. 35, 67, 79, 81, 82, 84-86, 90, 91, 97, 99, 102-104, 110, 
111, 113-116, 120-122, 125, 131-135, 143, 146, 147, 149, 151-160, 163-165, 
167-195, 197-202.
28 See more details further.
29 This goal was announced by the ILO Director General J. Somavia. See: ILO, 
International Labour Conference. 97th Session 2008. Report I (C). Decent Work. Some 
Strategic Challenges Ahead (Geneva: ILO, 2008), at 23.
30 This is the case, firstly, because such major countries as the US, China and India 
are not willing to ratify all the fundamental Conventions in the near future, 
and secondly because the increase in the absolute number of ratifications of 
the fundamental Conventions (see the data on ratification in the ILO Normlex 
database: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:0::NO:::) is offset as 
new member states that have not ratified any Conventions join the ILO from time to 
time. The proportion between ratified and non-ratified fundamental Conventions 
has remained steady for the last ten years.
31 The Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95) is cited as an example by the 
CEACR. See: ILO, General Survey of the reports concerning the Protection of Wages 
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2. “Instruments to be revised” is another status that is given to the Conventi-
ons and Recommendations that are supposed to be amended by some separate 
new provisions in the form of a Protocol or a new Convention. This status now 
is given to 22 Conventions32 and 13 Recommendations.33
3. “Instruments with interim status” is the classification for the Conventions 
and Recommendations that are not approved by the member states at present. 
This status is given to 23 Conventions34 and 22 Recommendations.35
4. “Request for information” status is given to the Conventions and Recommen-
dations for which a request concerning their relevance and the prospects for 
their amendment has been submitted to the Governing Body working groups. 
There are 3 Conventions36 and 12 Recommendations37 with such status. 
5. “Shelved Conventions” are the Conventions that are formally in force but 
closed to further ratification by the ILO. The ILO does not request any repor-
ting by the member states concerning their application. This status is usually 
given to Conventions that were later replaced by revised Conventions on the 
matter. Currently 25 Conventions are regarded as shelved.38
6. “Replaced Recommendations” status is given to 22 Recommendations39 that 
were later replaced by other ILO instruments.
7. “Outdated instruments” are the Conventions and Recommendations that 
are formally in force40 but are not applied in practice because of the adoption 
Convention (No. 95) and the Protection of Wages Recommendation (No. 85), 1949 
(Geneva: ILO, 2003), at 301 (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/
ilc91/pdf/rep-iii-1b.pdf).
32 Conventions Nos. 6, 8, 13, 16, 22, 27, 55, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 79, 90, 113, 114, 
119, 125, 127, 134, 136 and 153.
33 Recommendations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 10, 14, 75, 76, 80, 118,126, 128, 144 and 161.
34 Conventions Nos. 1-3, 11, 12, 19, 26, 30, 45, 47, 53, 58, 84, 85, 88, 89, 92, 96, 
99, 117, 132, 133 and 137.
35 Recommendations Nos. 9, 17, 20, 25, 30, 31, 41, 52, 68, 69, 83, 89, 98, 100, 107, 
108, 136, 140, 141, 145, 148 and 162.
36 Conventions Nos. 82, 83 and 126.
37 Recommendations Nos. 8, 13, 19, 71, 78, 92, 94, 129, 130, 137, 139 and 142.
38 Conventions Nos. 4, 15, 20, 21, 28, 34-41, 43, 44, 48-50, 60, 64, 65, 67, 86, 91 
and 104.
39 Recommendations Nos. 7, 27, 28, 53, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 77, 87, 88, 95, 101, 109, 
112, 117, 119, 123, 127, 150 and 196.
40	 From	a	legal	point	of	view,	to	say	that	an	ILO	Recommendation	is	“in	force”	is	quite	
dubious	because	a	Recommendation	is	at	best	a	“soft	law”.
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of a new instrument on the matter. There are 31 Conventions41 and 14 Re-
commendations42 with this status. 
8. “Withdrawn instruments”. An ILO Convention may receive this status 
upon a determination by an International Labour Conference that the Con-
vention in question has not received a sufficient number of ratifications over 
a long period of time. Five Conventions have this status now.43 There are also 
36 Recommendations regarded as withdrawn.44
9. “Abrogated Conventions” is a status that is supposed to be given to those 
Conventions that would undergo the procedure for abrogation, a step which 
will be possible only after the still pending Amendment of the ILO Constitu-
tion that will allow the abrogation of Conventions comes into force. Although 
this Amendment45 was adopted by the International Labour Conference in 
199746, up to the time this is written47 it has not received a sufficient number 
of ratifications to come into force.48 The possibility of abrogation of the ILO 
Conventions was discussed within the ILO as early as 1929.49 But at that 
time it was decided that such a procedure would contradict international law, 
inasmuch as the ILO cannot unilaterally cancel the obligations that sovereign 
states have placed upon themselves by the ratification of an international tre-
aty, i.e. an ILO Convention. A later discussion of the feasibility of abrogating 
41 Conventions Nos. 5, 7, 9, 10, 17, 18, 23-25, 32, 33, 42, 52, 54, 56, 57, 59, 62, 63, 
70, 72, 75, 76, 93, 101, 103, 107, 108, 109, 112 and 123.
42 Recommendations Nos. 22-24, 29, 40, 44, 47-49, 93, 105, 106, 124 and 138.
43 Conventions Nos. 31, 46, 51, 61 and 66.
44 Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 26, 32-34, 36-39, 42, 43, 
45, 46, 50, 51, 54, 56, 58, 59, 63-66, 70, 72-74 and 96.
45 ILO, Office of the Legal Advisor (JUR), Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution 
of the International Labour Organization, 1997 (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
bureau/leg/amend/1997.htm). 
46 See on this topic: ILO, Director-general Report to the 85th meeting of the International 
Labour Conference: “The ILO, standards setting and globalization” (Geneva: ILO, 1997), 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc85/dg-rep.htm).
47 Last revision, March 2014.
48 Amendments of the ILO Constitution have to be ratified by at least two thirds of 
the	member	states	including	at	least	ten	countries	of	“chief	industrial	importance”	
(specifically mentioned in the ILO Constitution). At the moment of writing only 
two ratifications of the 124 necessary are lacking for this amendment to come into 
force. See the ratification status at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/
download/1997-list.pdf.
49 ILO, International Labour Conference Record of proceedings of the 13th Session (1929) of the 
Conference, Vol. I, Third Part (Appendices) (Geneva: ILO, 1929), at 733-734.
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the Conventions centred on the contractual status of the ILO Conventions 
and	the	possibility	that	they	might	turn	into	international	“quasi-laws”.50 Cu-
rrently there are seven ILO Conventions that are candidates to be abrogated 
when the ILO Constitution Amendment permitting abrogation will come into 
force.51 
The Cartier Group classification did not include technical Conventions 
concerning the final articles of the ILO Conventions.52 And there was no de-
cision agreed upon within the Working Party concerning the Termination of 
Employment Convention and Recommendation of 1982.53
It is plain to see that these classifications, which are aimed at clarifying 
the unwieldy bulk of ILO Conventions and Recommendations and making 
navigation among them easier, are themselves quite complicated. It seems that 
is quite difficult for both the representatives of the member states and the 
legal authorities at a national level that are supposed to apply the ILO instru-
ments to understand the differences between these statuses. In certain cases 
the qualification of a particular instrument as having a certain status is quite 
questionable. 
Because	the	Cartier	Group’s	work	on	the	classification	of	instruments	co-
uld not be considered as complete and final, discussion on the matter has 
continued within the ILO Governing Body from 2005 up to the present.54 
50 See the discussion on the matter in: Nicolas Valticos, Contrat – Convention – Traité 
– Loi? Les conventions internationales du travail, Revue des sciences morales et 
politiques, Vol. 100, No. 1 (1996), at 403-413; Gerardo von Potobski, Eficacia 
jurídica de los convenios de la OIT en el plano nacional, in Jean-Claude Javillier, Bernard 
Gernigon	(eds.),	Les	normes	internationales	du	travail:	un	patrimoine	pour	l’avenir.	
Mélanges	 en	 l’honneur	 de	Nicolas	 Valticos	 (Geneva:	 ILO,	 2004),	 at	 288;	 John	
Wood, International Labour Organisation Conventions – Labour Code or Treaties?, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1991), at 649-657; 
ILO, Governing Body. Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards. 
Abrogation or Extinguishment of International Labour Conventions. ILO Doc. No. GB.265/
LILS/ WP/PRS/2 (Geneva: ILO, 1996).
51 The seven Conventions are: No. 4 of 1919; No. 15 of 1921; No. 28 of 1929; No. 
41 of 1934; No. 60 of 1937; No. 67 of 1939; No. 91 of 1949.
52 Conventions Nos. 80 and 116.
53 Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166.
54 ILO, Governing Body 294th Session, Geneva, November 2005. Committee on Legal Issues 
and International Labour Standards (LILS). Improvements in the standards-related activities 
of the ILO: Outlines of a future strategic orientation for standards and for implementing 
standards-related policies and procedures. ILO Doc. No. GB.294/LILS/4 (Geneva: ILO, 
2005), at 7.
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The prospects for creating a new Working Party were discussed in 2012.55 Cu-
rrently the Governing Body is trying to determine which instruments should 
be analysed: all ILO Conventions and Recommendations or only the ones that 
were not studied by the Cartier Group (i.e. the instruments that were adopted 
after 1985).56 
The discussion of the systematization of the ILO instruments is described 
as	the	“creation	of	a	robust	and	effective	international	labour	code”.57 Never-
theless, just as with the pre-War publications of the ILO instruments, there 
has been no discussion concerning the creation of any unified and codified 
international act. The subject of debate is limited to finding some convenient 
way to present the existing Conventions and Recommendations.58
III.  THE ILO MONITORING MECHANISM FOR APPLICATION OF 
THE CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to the complexity of the standards adopted by the ILO, the 
rather complicated system for monitoring of their application is in itself a pro-
blem. An overall description of these procedures is certainly needed in order 
to understand the issue.
There are two main procedures of control over the application of ILO stan-
dards: a regular system of supervision and special procedures for examining 
representations and complaints relating to the ratified Conventions.59
The regular system of supervision includes reporting by the ILO member states 
55 ILO, Governing Body 313th Session, Geneva, 15–30 March 2012. Legal Issues and 
International Labour Standards Section (LILS). ILO Doc. No. GB.313/LILS/PV/Draft 
(Geneva: ILO, 2012), at 13.
56 ILO, Governing Body 312th Session, Geneva, November 2011. Legal Issues and International 
Labour Standards Section. International Labour Standards and Human Rights Segment 
(LILS). ILO standards policy: The establishment and the implementation of a standards 
review mechanism. ILO Doc. No. GB.312/LILS/5 (Geneva: ILO, 2012), at 11.
57 ILO, Governing Body 310th Session, Geneva, March, 2011. Committee on Legal Issues and 
International Labour Standards (LILS). Improvements in the standards-related activities of 
the ILO - ILO standards policy: An approach for a robust and effective international labour 
code. ILO Doc. No. GB.310/LILS/3/1 (Geneva: ILO, 2011), at 1.
58 ILO, Governing Body 310th Session, Geneva, March 2011. LILS. Second report: 
International labour standards and human rights. ILO Doc. No. GB.310/11/2(Rev.) 
(Geneva: ILO, 2011) at 9.
59 See: ILO, Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendations (Geneva: ILO, 2006), at 20-40.
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on their compliance with ratified and non-ratified Conventions according to 
art. 22 and 19 (paras. 5 and 6) of the ILO Constitution. These reports are 
submitted to the CEACR, a panel that includes independent academic experts 
in labour law from different countries. The CEACR responds to the member 
states’	reports	(or	failures	to	provide	such	reports)	by	issuing	Observations and 
Direct Requests. Observations are made in the more serious cases of failure by 
member states to comply with the ILO standards or to provide satisfactory 
information. They are published in the CEACR General Report annually. Each 
General Report is a large volume of about 1,000 pages.60 Direct Requests are 
not published but are relayed to the member states when the CEACR consi-
ders that an issue may be solved by means of direct communication.
The next kind of regular procedure is the Conference Committee on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations (Conference Committee) formed on 
a tripartite basis in the course of each International Labour Conference. The 
Conference Committee examines the CEACR General Report, the member sta-
tes’	reports	and	some of the most serious cases brought to light in the CEACR 
Observations. This last task is considered to be the most important among the 
Conference	Committee’s	 functions.	The	 representatives	of	 the	 governments	
of the countries in question are invited to a discussion within the Conference 
Committee. The activity of the Conference Committee is considered very va-
luable by ILO experts.61 Nevertheless, there is no practical way for this control 
body to make an objective determination which cases are the most serious, 
even though the Conference Committee is supposed to deal with the most 
serious violations of the international labour standards. It picks about 25 cases 
annually62 out of the hundreds of cases examined by the CEACR. 
The special system of control comprises several different procedures. First of 
all,	art.	24	of	the	ILO	Constitution	provides	for	employers’	or	workers’	indu-
60 See for example last CEACR Reports: ILO, International Labour Conference, 101st 
Session, 2012. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution). Report III (Part 1A). 
General Report and observations concerning particular countries (Geneva: ILO, 2012); ILO, 
International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013. General Report and observations 
concerning particular countries (Geneva: ILO, 2013).
61 Francis Maupain, Une Rolls Royce en mal de révision? L’efficacité du système de supervision 
de l’OIT à l’approche de son centenaire,	Revue	Générale	de	Droit	International	Public,	
No. 3 (2010), at 495.
62 See: ILO, The Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour 
Conference: a dynamic and impact built on decades of dialogue and persuasion (Geneva: 
ILO, 2011), at 2.
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strial associations to make a representation against a government of a member 
state63	concerning	its	failure	to	“...secure	in	any	respect	the	effective	observan-
ce	within	its	jurisdiction	of	any	Convention	to	which	it	is	a	party”.	There	is	
a special procedure of examination for such representations regulated by the 
Standing Orders adopted by the ILO Governing Body.64 The International 
Labour Office transfers a representation that it has received to the Governing 
Body, which invites the member state in question to respond to this repre-
sentation. In case the member state fails to respond in a reasonable period of 
time, the Governing Body may establish a special tripartite ad hoc committee to 
examine the representation or refer the representation to the ILO Committee 
on Freedom of Association (CFA, see further). After the examination of the re-
presentation, the tripartite committee makes a report to the Governing Body.
The Governing Body also has an option to use another control procedure: 
filing a complaint according to art. 26 of the ILO Constitution. In such cases 
a special (also ad hoc) Commission of Inquiry is established. This procedure is 
considered to be one of the most radical measures that the ILO may employ to 
apply pressure to the member states and persuade them to comply with inter-
national labour standards. This procedure may be initiated by a motion of the 
Governing Body itself, or by any ILO member state, or by the delegates of the 
International Labour Conference. The results of the examination of a compla-
int are published in the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The government 
of the member state in question is obliged to react within the three months65 
after the publication of the report by stating its intentions concerning the ful-
filment of the recommendations made.
There are no follow-up procedures associated with the results of representa-
tions and complaints according to art. 24 and 26 of the ILO Constitution. This 
issue was addressed by the Governing Body in 200066, but the situation has 
not changed since that time. In the event of a refusal to follow the recommen-
63 Or former member state that is a party to the ILO Convention in question.
64 ILO, Standing Orders concerning the procedure for the examination of representations under 
articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization Adopted 
by the Governing Body at its 57th Session (8 April 1932), modified at its 82nd Session 
(5 February 1938), 212th Session (7 March 1980), and 291st Session (18 November 
2004), (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/
meetingdocument/wcm_041899.pdf).
65 Art. 29, para. 2, ILO Constitution.
66 ILO, Governing Body, 279th Session, November 2000. Possible improvements in ILO 
standards-related activities. ILO Doc. No.279/4 (Geneva: ILO, 2000), at 12.
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dations of the International Labour Conference, the case may be referred to 
the UN International Court of Justice.67 There has never been such a prece-
dent in the history of the ILO to date.
The most extreme measure that the ILO may apply to the non-compliance 
of a member state with the international labour standards is provided in art. 
33 of the ILO Constitution. If the member state fails to carry out the re-
commendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, 
or	in	the	decision	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice,	as	the	case	may	be,	“…
the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may 
deem	wise	and	expedient	to	secure	compliance	therewith”.	
The grievance procedure most resorted to within the framework of ILO 
control involves the concept of freedom of association. A special Committee 
on	Freedom	of	Association	(CFA)	is	responsible	for	this	procedure.	Workers’	
and	employers’	associations	may	file	complaints	to	the	CFA	claiming	breach	
of the principles provided by ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and in the 
relevant case law. Member states are obliged to abide by the CFA decisions, 
although there is no special enforcement procedure, except for the provisions 
concerning the representations and complaints according to art. 24 and 26 of 
the ILO Constitution (see above). In 1979 the Governing Body agreed68 to 
strengthen CFA control functions through more frequent use of the ILO field 
structure so that the CFA would have better information from a mission dis-
patched immediately to the field. This was to enable reaching conclusions on 
cases more quickly. But these decisions were never implemented in practice.
Another control institution related to freedom of association is the Fact 
Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association (FFCC) that was 
established in 1950 as a result of an agreement between the ILO and the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).69 It carries out its activity on an ad 
hoc basis and was first called upon 14 years after it was established.70 During 
67 Art. 29, para. 2, ILO Constitution.
68 William R. Simpson, Standard-setting and supervision: A system in difficulty, in Jean-
Claude Javillier et Bernard Gernigon (eds.), Les normes internationales du travail: 
un	patrimoine	pour	l’avenir	Mélanges	en	l’honneur	de	Nicolas	Valticos	(Geneva:	
ILO, 2004), at 68-69.
69 See in detail: Nicolas Valticos, La Commission d’investigation et de conciliation en matière 
de liberté syndicale et le mécanisme de protection internationale des droits syndicaux, Annuaire 
français	de	droit	international	(Paris:	Centre	national	de	la	recherché	scientifique,	
1967), at 445-468. 
70 In 1964 to examine freedom of association in the public sector in Japan. See: ILO, 
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the period that it has been active, it has examined only six cases71, the last of 
which was considered more than twenty years ago.72 The infrequent use of this 
procedure may be explained by the fact that the consent of the state under 
examination is required in order to grant the FFCC the authority to examine 
the case whenever that state has not ratified the applicable Convention on 
freedom of association. Such consent is very rarely given in practice. From the 
moment of its creation the FFCC has been thwarted by lack of trust and of 
willingness to cooperate on the part of the ILO member states.73
The realization that regular and routine examination of cases infringing 
upon the freedom of association within the FFCC framework was impossible 
was a reason for the establishment of CFA. Nevertheless, the rare examples of 
FFCC engagement were considered to be more effective and successful than 
the Commission of Inquiry investigations performed under art. 26 of the ILO 
Constitution.74 This is because member states that have voluntarily agreed to 
take part in the examination of a case are more open to cooperation with the 
ILO	control	bodies	in	preference	to	the	“naming	and	shaming”	procedure	of	
art. 26.
There are other special ILO control procedures that are associated with 
its separate instruments (ILO Declarations, 1977, 1998 and 2008, Maritime 
Labour Convention, 2006).
Like the body of ILO instruments, the ILO monitoring and control system 
was created not according to some plan that was elaborated in advance, but 
rather as a reaction to the circumstances and needs of the time. This has ine-
vitably led to difficulties in using the control mechanisms. For example, the 
CEACR was created in 1926 when it became clear that it was impossible to 
examine	all	the	member	states’	reports	within	the	International	Labour	Confe-
Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association concerning 
the Persons Employed in the Public Sector in Japan (Geneva: ILO, 1966). 
71 See the ILO site: Reports of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commissions on Freedom of 
Association (http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-publica-
tions/WCMS_160778/lang--en/index.htm). 
72 ILO, Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association 
concerning the Republic of South Africa. ILO. Doc. No. GB.253/15/7 (Geneva: ILO, 
1992). 
73 Max Rood, New Developments within the ILO supervisory system, in Roger Blanpain 
(ed.), Labour Law, Human Rights and Social Justice. Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Ruth Ben-Israel (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 90.
74 William R. Simpson, op. cit. (fn. 68), at 67-68.
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rence plenary sessions. In 1932 a procedure of representations and complaints 
was established.75 In 1946 the ILO Constitution was amended in order to 
reflect	reporting	obligations	for	a	member	state	to	that	state’s	own	authorities	
that were concerned with the adoption of the ILO Conventions76 and also to 
the ILO about the measures taken in respect of the ratification of the Conven-
tion in question.77 The CFA was established in 1951 after the adoption of the 
fundamental Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining 
and failure of the FFCC to provide routine examination of freedom of associa-
tion cases.78 After the adoption of the Tripartite Consultation (International 
Labour Standards) Convention of 1976 (No. 144) the control procedures were 
modified in order to involve the social partners to a larger extent. Over almost 
a hundred years of ILO operations, its procedures have been modified quite 
significantly. This is true of the corpus of the Conventions and Recommen-
dations as well, and some of these procedures have become outdated in the 
course of time.
There were numerous discussions within the ILO concerning the lack of 
transparency of the monitoring system, the overlapping of the procedures and 
their interference with each other and with the powers of the control bodies. 
Even the Governing Body delegates and ILO officials with substantial experi-
ence in the involvement of the ILO have difficulty arriving at a clear picture 
of the monitoring system.79 As the International Labour Office sees it, the 
weakest area of understanding the control procedures by the representatives of 
the member states is the reporting obligations of the authorities of the member 
states concerning the Conventions adopted according to art. 19, para. 5 of the 
Constitution.80
For example, the CEACR procedures and the procedure for representations 
with respect to the member states have different goals and origins but are 
often used in similar situations with the same results: publicizing information 
about breaches of the international labour standards by a member state. The 
75 Art. 24 and 26 of the ILO Constitution.
76 Art. 19, para. 5 of the ILO Constitution.
77 Art. 22 of the ILO Constitution.
78 ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 of 1948 and 1949.
79 ILO, Governing Body, 279th Session, November 2000. Possible improvements in ILO 
standards-related activities. ILO Doc. No. GB.279/4 (Geneva: ILO, 2000), at 10.
80 ILO, The Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference. 
A dynamic and impact build on decades of dialogue and persuasion, op. cit. (fn. 62), at 137.
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procedures are used very unevenly. The main burden of monitoring and con-
trol is placed on the CEACR and the CFA. The CEACR examines between two 
and three thousand reports from member states each year.81 The Conference 
Committee accepts only about 25 cases for examination at the International 
Labour Conference session82 based on the Observations made by the CEA-
CR. The choice of cases is mainly determined not by the actual content of 
the CEACR comments, but rather by the practical possibilities of having the 
Conference Committee examine a case.83 The choice of cases is performed by 
the Conference Committee itself based on the proposals of its members (in 
almost all cases these are delegates of workers and employers).84 There are no 
clear criteria for this choice. Most of the cases examined are associated with 
fundamental or governance Conventions.85 Other instruments, although they 
may cover very important labour rights (e.g. wages or occupational safety and 
health, etc.) usually fall outside of the attention of the ILO higher monitoring 
authority.
81 See the CEACR Report on the ILO site: http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/
ilo/P/09661/.
82 ILO, The Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference: 
a dynamic and impact built on decades of dialogue and persuasion, op. cit. (fn. 62), at 2.
83 For more information see: ILO, Governing Body, 279th Session, November 2000. 
Possible improvements in ILO standards-related activities. ILO Doc. No. GB.279/4, op. 
cit. (fn. 79), at 8-12; ILO, Governing Body, 306th Session Geneva, November 2009. 
Reports of the Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards. Second report: 
International labour standards and human rights. ILO Doc. No. GB.306/10/2(Rev.) 
(Geneva: ILO, 2000), at 2-3, et al.
84 ILO Doc. No. GB.279/4., op. cit. (fn. 79), at 9-11.
85 In 2011, 20 cases out of a total of 26 pertained to the fundamental Conventions, 
and two more to the governance Conventions (see: ILO, International Labour 
Conference, 100th Session, Geneva, 2011. Committee on the Application of Standards at the 
Conference. Extracts from the Record of Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 2011); in 2010, 22 
cases out of a total of 26 pertained to the fundamental Conventions, and one more 
to the governance Conventions (ILO, International Labour Conference, 99th Session, 
Geneva, 2010. Committee on the Application of Standards at the Conference. Extracts 
from the Record of Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 2010); in 2009, 23 out of 26 were 
fundamental, and one pertained to governance (ILO, International Labour Conference, 
98th Session, Geneva, 2009. Committee on the Application of Standards at the Conference. 
Extracts from the Record of Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 2009); in 2008, 21 out of 25 
were fundamental and two more pertained to governance (ILO, International Labour 
Conference, 97th Session, Geneva, 2008. Committee on the Application of Standards at the 
Conference. Extracts from the Record of Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 2008). The situation 
was similar in other years.
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The CFA has examined 3,045 freedom of association cases from 1952 to 
date.86 Representations to the Governing Body according to art. 24 of the ILO 
Constitution have been examined 164 times since 1924.87 The recourse to this 
procedure has been very irregular. It was used from time to time in the early 
period of ILO activity, but then there were almost no representations until 
the	1970s	(only	 three	cases	between	1938	and	1974).	The	“second	 life”	of	
this procedure started in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s.88 The use of 
representations became more casual at the beginning of the 21st century: there 
were	3.3	representations	on	average	in	the	century’s	first	decade	compared	to	
8.1 in 1990s. A Commission of Inquiry according to art. 26 of the ILO Consti-
tution has been convened only 12 times89 in the history of ILO. In most cases 
a special tripartite committee was established, while in some cases the matter 
was passed to the CFA.90
The most extreme control procedure, which is a call from International 
Labour Conference to the member states to take measures affecting a member 
state in violation according to art. 33 of the ILO Constitution, has been used 
only once in the history of the ILO regarding Myanmar in 2000.91 As has alre-
ady been mentioned, the FFCC has been convened only six times. As a result, 
some of the monitoring procedures are used in the routine regime while others 
are	 only	 “activated”	 in	 exceptional	 cases.	The	 choice	 of	 procedure	depends	
86 January 2014. See: ILO, Normlex, Supervising the application of international 
labour standards. Search Freedom of Association cases: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=1000:20030:0::NO:::. 
87 ILO, Normlex, Representations (Art. 24): http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1
000:50010:3729097806904372::::P50010_DISPLAY_BY:1.
88 The absolute record was set in 1996 when 27 representations were examined. In 
1994 and 1995 there were 10 examinations each year and 9 examinations in 1998. 
Since that time the number of examinations has dropped.
89 See the cases in the ILO Normlex Database: Complaints/Commissions of Inquiry 
(Art. 26): http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50011:0::NO::P50011_
ARTICLE_NO:26.
90 ILO, Governing Body 301st Session, Geneva, March 2008. Committee on Legal Issues and 
International Labour Standards (LILS) Sixth item on the agenda. Improvements in the 
standards-related activities of the ILO: Initial implementation of the interim plan of action to 
enhance the impact of the standards system. ILO Doc. No. GB.301/LILS/6(Rev.) (Geneva: 
ILO, 2008), at 23.
91 ILO, International Labour Conference. Eighty-eighth Session, Geneva, 2000. Resolution 
concerning the measures recommended by the Governing Body under article 33 of the ILO 
Constitution on the subject of Myanmar. ILO site: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/relm/ilc/ilc88/resolutions.htm#_ftn1.
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not so much on the kind of violation as on the subjective decision of the in-
stitution submitting a complaint or on the control bodies of the ILO. Such a 
situation makes it quite difficult for the member states and social partners to 
understand the system of monitoring procedures.
The Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards of 
the ILO Governing Body (LILS) made a case study in 200892 concerning the 
effectiveness of interaction between the various control procedures based on 
seven selected practical examples.93 As the case study shows, the coordination 
between various procedures mainly depends on the ILO Governing Body. The 
recourse to one or another procedure depends mainly on the participants in 
the case. The explanation is that the ILO Constitution does not provide for 
direct links between the different control procedures and does not establish 
any priorities for the examination of cases. In some cases it was shown that 
lack of constant attention to the cases from the complaining party has led to 
a delay in the examination for an indefinite period. In almost every case the 
same matter was taken up separately by different control institutions. In all 
cases the examination took many years. In the case of Myanmar it took more 
than forty years. This case was unique not only because of the International La-
bour Conference recourse to art. 33 of the Constitution, but also because this 
case was discussed at the Conference Committee and plenary session of the 
International Labour Conference annually94 for many years until the summer 
of 2013.95 Although the Myanmar case involved very serious violations with 
92 ILO, Governing Body 303rd Session, Geneva, November 2008. Committee on Legal Issues 
and International Labour Standards (LILS) Fourth item on the agenda. Improvements in the 
standards-related activities of the ILO: Improving the coherence, integration and effectiveness 
of the supervisory system through a better understanding of its dynamics (further study from 
a substantive and practical standpoint). ILO Doc. No. GB.303/LILS/4/2 (Geneva: ILO, 
2008).
93 Cases Nos. 1 and 2 concerned freedom of association (Nepal and Nicaragua); Nos. 
3 and 4 concerned forced labour (Dominican Republic together with Haiti and 
separately Myanmar); No. 5 concerned equal opportunity (Czech Republic and 
Slovakia); No. 6 wages (Congo); No. 7 social protection (Netherlands).
94 See on the development of the situation in Myanmar: ILO, International Labour 
Conference. 101st Session, Geneva, May–June 2012. Provisional Record. Additional agenda 
item. Review of measures previously adopted by the International Labour Conference to secure 
compliance by Myanmar with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry (Geneva: 
ILO, 2012).
95 ILO, International Labour Conference. 102nd Session, Geneva, June 2013. Additional 
agenda item: Further review of remaining measures previously adopted by the International 
Labour Conference under article 33 of the ILO Constitution to secure compliance by Myanmar 
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respect to forced labour, it would be a great exaggeration to claim that such 
a case is absolutely unique in the world. There are many other very serious 
violations of labour rights96 that did not receive the attention due them from 
the ILO control bodies.
According to the evaluation by the LILS, in three cases among the seven 
that were discovered the issues remained unsettled. Partial settlement was 
achieved in two cases, and complete settlement in only one case of seven. In 
some cases of partial settlement, that success was achieved not because of the 
ILO involvement but because of internal political factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that it would be totally unrealistic to expect the same level 
of effectiveness from an international organization as from a state that can 
apply its sovereign power to any subject of national law. But the empirical 
data provided above shows that ILO control mechanisms could operate much 
more effectively. There have been different suggestions in the literature and 
in internal ILO studies concerning possible improvement of the ILO control 
mechanisms, but up to now they have not been implemented in practice.
The measures that could make the control system more effective might 
include the following:
1. An amendment to the ILO Constitution to clearly rationalize the 
status of the ILO control machinery. This could alter the control 
bodies’	 status	and	would	help	 to	avoid	 the	ambiguities	 related	 to	
them.
2. The abolition of secondary and seldom used procedures that serve 
only to make understanding the ILO control system more difficult.
3. Formation of a clear, transparent and easily understood procedure 
for control over the reporting system and examination of complaints, 
with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry Arrangements for consideration of all 
relevant issues concerning Myanmar at the 102nd Session of the Conference (Geneva: ILO, 
2013), at 2-1/2.
96 Such as, for example, some Middle East petro-dynasties. See for example: 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Internationally Recognised Core 
Labour Standards in Saudi Arabia: Report For the WTO General Council Review of the 
Trade Policies of Saudi Arabia (Geneva, 25 And 27 January 2012) (http://www.ituc-csi.
org/IMG/pdf/final_tpr_saudi_arabia.pdf). 
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including two stages of examination. The second stage should 
examine all unresolved issues, rather than being invoked on a casual 
basis as is now done. This system should also be clearly reflected in 
the ILO Constitution.
4. Even though only in exceptional cases, the ILO should have recourse 
to art. 33 of the ILO Constitution from time to time.
The modification of the system of the ILO instruments might include its 
gradual codification. Codification of all Conventions and Recommendations 
at once does not seem realistic. Nevertheless, when the ILO Constitutional 
amendment of 1997 that would allow abrogating the old Conventions finally 
comes into force, it would be possible to begin to undertake a broad codifica-
tion of the ILO instruments. Such instruments could combine both binding 
and recommendation norms covering several broad topics and categories of 
workers. The Maritime Labour Convention could serve as a good example of 
such possible codification. There might be about 10 to 15 such mega-Con-
ventions covering all the major issues in international labour law. These acts 
could include not just framework provisions in certain areas but specific norms 
(even if some of them were previously established in the earlier Conventions 
and Recommendations). After the Constitutional amendment of 1997 comes 
into force, it would be necessary to abrogate as many irrelevant and outdated 
Conventions as possible in exchange for the adoption of the new instrument 
on the matter.
If the ILO would persevere in this policy, it would be possible to combine 
these large instruments into a comprehensive international labour code in the 
future.
It seems that ILO reforms of this kind might significantly improve the 
effectiveness of the application of the international labour standards adopted 
under its auspices. 
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U radu se obrađuje složeni sustav konvencija i preporuka Međunarodne organiza-
cije rada (MOR) i postupci nadzora nad njihovom primjenom kao čimbenik s izrazito 
negativnim utjecajem na njihovu učinkovitost. Razmatra se perspektiva kodificiranja 
standarda MOR-a. Izneseni su zaključci u vezi s mogućnosti postupne kodifikacije kon-
vencija i preporuka prema širim tematskim cjelinama te daljnjeg stvaranja jedinstvenog 
međunarodnog radnog zakonika. Predlažu se smjernice za klasifikaciju tematskih cjelina.
Posebno su analizirani postupci nadzora koje provodi MOR te je zaključeno da im 
nedostaje koordinacije i sistematizacije. Iznesene su preporuke za pojednostavnjenje tih 
postupaka, za ukidanje rijetko rabljenih i sekundarnih postupaka te za postizanje vi-
šeg stupnja usklađenosti među postojećim postupcima kako bi primjena međunarodnih 
radnih standarda bila učinkovitija. Također su izloženi i dodatni prijedlozi u vezi sa 
smanjenjem složenosti standarda MOR-a i sustava nadzora nad njihovom primjenom.
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